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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

~I.

A. SHAW, FRANK ARMSTRO·NG,
et al.,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
vs.

CAsE No.

7380

SALT LAKE COUNTY, a Municipal
corporation, et al.,

Defenda!nts and Ap,p1ellants.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The appellants in their brief have stated the facts
disclosed at the trial of this cause very briefly and we
do not feel that they inform the court sufficiently as to
the location or the nature of the proposed operation.
This is especially true in light of the fact that one of
appellant's Assignment of Errors is "That the Cq!Jrt
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erred in finding that the operation of defendants' proposed plant would be a Nuisance." (Appellant's Brief
Page 3).
There are eighty-seven (87) parties plaintiff in this
action. They are residents of what has been defined as
the Cottonwood District in Salt Lake County. Plaintiffs Exhibit "A," which consi;sts of the present ownership plats filed in the County Recorde·r's office of Salt
Lake County, outlines the general area affected and
locates the site of the proposed gravel mining and
asphalt plant of Salt Lake County and also the properties of the plaintiffs in this action. The testimony is
that the proposed plant as located on the Exhibit io
located on a hill or bluff overlooking and to the east of
the residences of most of the parties plaintiffs. Plruntiffs Exhibit '' B'' is a panorama picture of the area
and will apprise the Court of the nature of the terrain
and identify the locations of the various points testified
to at the trial. The other exhibits introduced by the
Plaintiffs show the general nature of the home-a located
in the area.
The testimony is not disputed that the general area
in which the Plaintiffs reside is the finest residential
area in the State of Utah. (Trans. 15-19, R.ec. 76-80)
The testimony is also undisputed that the only means of
ingress and egreos to the plant is by means of a road
running east and south from Holladay Boulevard and
entering Holladay Boulevard at 5800 :South.
This action was commenced by Plaintiffs before
the proposed operation had actually commenced. PrepSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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arations '\Yere at the ti1ne under way. The operation as
proposed '\Vas described by Commissioner Greenwood,
the County· Conunissioner in charge of roads and bridges
as follows: (Trans. 185-186-187-188, Rec. 247, 248, 249,
250).
(a) One hot asphalt plant which has been called
the Catmul Plant, the op·eration of which was described
by the 'vi tnesses Nielsen (Trans. 81 to 85, Rec. 142
to 146) and Higgins (Trans. 76 to 80, Rec. 137 to 142:).
This plant ia powered by a diesel engine and the dryer
fired by coal.
(b) One 100 ton per hour jaw gravel crusher powered by a diesel engine.
(c) One diesel powered bulldozer.
(d) One diesel powered draglin,e.
(e) Diesel or gasoline powered loaders.
(f) 100 truck loads a day moving to and from the
plant during the operation.
The testimony of the witnesses Nielsen, Higgins and
Butler are to the effect that the operation of this plant
and comparable plants are noisy, du·.sty and that tar
residue is emitted.
It should be remembered that the descriptions of
the witnesses Higgins and Nielsen covered only the
operation of the Catmul asphalt plant and did not inelude the mining or crushing of gravel. The testimony
of the witness Butler covered only the operation of the
asphalt plant of Salt Lake City and did not cover these
other operations.
The testimony of Commissioner Greenwood is that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the operation of dies,el units is noisy. (Trans. 188, Rec.
250)

There is some conflict in the evidence as to the
direction of the prevailing winds in the area. We will
analyze this testimony in our argument.
ARGUMENT
We will argue the points of law raised by the appellants in the same order as they are pres-ented in their
brief.
1. (a) Whet:her Salt Lake Couw.ty enjoys a sovereign immuwity, .as a political subdimision of the St.ate .of
Utah wh!ich p'r'ecludes the m:aintewamae agaimS't it of this
kind of action?
'The answer to question (a) of app·ellants. brief also
ans.wers (h).
As we understand the points attemp·ted to be made
under these headings it is simply that the sovereign
cannot be sued unless express statutory consent is given
and that the County as a creature of the s-overeign is
immune. We will concede that a sovereign cannot be
sued without its consent. We will further concede that
the County is a creature of the so"Viereign.
We believe the answer to the p·ropositions raised
by appellants is definitely answered hy the Statutes. In
defining the p~owers of the counties of this State the legisla_ture has p~rovided:
Title 19, Chapter 4, S·ection 3, Utah Code Annotated
1943.
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GENERAL POWERS
~~_A.

(1)

county has power:
To sue and be sued."

The appellants argument loses all of its substance
because the State has never relinquish·ed its immunity,
except in specific instances. State vs. District Court of
Salt Lake County, 102 Utah 290, 128 P2nd 471. There
is no statute under the provisions of which the State of
Utah can ~ ' sue or be sued.'' Remedial action against
the State is in the main allowed against the officers and
commissions of the State, not against the State itself.
The legislature has hy the enactment of the quoted
statute specifically authorized suits against counties. The
question as to whether or not the county is liable for the
particular wrong alleged is an entirely different question
which will be argued later. There is no statutory enumeration of the nature of actions which can be brought
against the county. If the reasoning used by app·ellants
were adopted then no action could be maintained against
a county except those enumerated in 104-3-27 Utah Code
Annotated 1943, which sets forth the actions which may
be brought against the State. These actions are of a
very limited nature and if this reasoning were sound,
the question of the county's immunity from suit would
have been raised many times.
The mechanics for obtaining service against the
county are specifically provided for in the statutes.
Section 104-5-11 Revised Statutes of Utah 1943 provides
in p-art:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

'''The summons. must be served by delivering
a copy thereof a.s follows : * * *
(2) If the defendant is a county, to a county
commissioner or to the county clerk of such
county.''
There is no comparable ·section covering seTvice
on the State. See State vs. District Court of Salt Lake
County, supra.
(b) The real question 11aised Ull"'tder ( 0) O:S we view
it is not w·hether or not .the county is immune from suit
by re·ason of its sovereignty, but ·w·hether the w~ong
alleged is actionable ag·ainst the County.
As has been stated in appellants brief this is an
action in equity to enjoin a threatened nuisance. An
action to enjoin or abate a nuisance is not pTedicated on
negligence. 9 Am. Juris. 282. No relief is asked, except
injunction against the proposed nuisance. 39 Am. Juris.
282 says this among other things relative to the· nature
of an action based on nuisance.
'' * * * and it has been said that an action
for a nuisance which violates a prop·erty right
incident to the ownership of land is in the nature
of one for tres:p,ass to realty.''
The pleadings, p•roof and findings of fact iil this
case support the proposition that unless the operation
of the ·proposed plant be enjoined there would be a
violation of a property right incident to the ownership
of land by reason of the dust, odors and noise which
would inevitably result from the operation of the plant.
This court has held that injunction will lie against
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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a county for trespass. The case of Aagard vs. Juab
County, 75 Utah 6, 281 (P) 728, was an action for damages against the Courity for land allege·d to have been
taken by the County for a highway which land belonged
to the plaintiff. The plaintiff had not presented a
claim to the county as provided by statute and because
this had not been done the court rendered judgment fo'r
the county on the pleadings. In reversing the District
Court this court held that in an action such as the one
brought it was not necessary to file a claim. In discussing the sufficiency of the complaint the court said the
following:
''In this p·roceeding a strip of land is the
subject matter of dispute. The plaintiff alleges
that he is the owner in fee simple of the land.
While plaintiff specifically prays for a money
judgment for the value of the land, in dispute,
he also pirays for 'such further and other relief
as may be just.' The facts alleged in the complaint, if true, are clearly sufficient to entitle
plaintiff to a decree quieting title to the land in
controversy and to injunctive ~elief." (Italics
ours)
The appellants in their brief have quoted the rule
as set forth in Corpus Juris Secundum as to the liability
of a county for a v-uisance. 14 Am. Juris. 237 says the
following:
''Certain ·sp·ecific remedies such as injunction, quo warranto, may be invoked against counties.''
Also at page 218 is the following:
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Sec. 52. ''There is authority for the view
that a county may incur a tort liability in reference to one who stands in the relation of an
adjoining proprietor to it. A county, in the construction of a public work, is not p·rivileged to
commit a nuisance to the special injury of the
citizens. It is liable as a private individual in
damage for such act."
I

The applicable rule is set forth in the ease of Young
v-s.. Juneau County, 192 Wis. 646, 652, 212 N. W. 295,
2"97 when the court said:
"The doctrine of liability of a municipal corporation in cases where the relation is that of one
proprietor to another is so well entrenched in
the jurisp·rudence of this State that it cannot be
disturbed, and by this we do not indicate it should
be. * * * In this case the county of Juneau maintained upon adjoining premises a defective engine.
Although repeatedly warned of the defect, its
officers and agents continued to use the same,
with the result that the plaintiff sustained damage, not as a traveJer, but as a prop·rietor. Under
such circumstances the case is ruled by Matson
v. Dane County (172 Wis. 522, 179 N. W. 774),
sup·ra, and the cases there cited and considered,
and the complaint must be held to hold that the
defendant m'aintained a nuisance. If as an adjoining p·roprietor it violated a legal duty owing by
it to the plaintiff, liability follows just as in the
case of Bunker v. Hudson (122 Wis. 43, 99 N. W.
448), supra.
This case was cited with ap·proval in the case of
Necedah Mfg. Corp. v. Juneau County, 206 Wis. 316,
237 N. W. 227, 240 N. W. 405, 96· A.L.R. 4.
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The appellants in their brief have cited the case of
Lu~d vs. S·alt Lake County, 58 Utah 546, 200 (P) 515,
in support of their theory of ·sovereign immunity and
have quoted a portion of that case. We do not think
the .case deals in any particular with immunity of the
county from suit in tort actions. At most it deals only
\vith the liability of the county for damages for the
. negligent act of its employees. This was a case for
damages caused by the county's emp·loyees allowing
water from a reservoir to go into th·e fish ponds of th·e
plaintiff while the reservoir was being cleaned. The
action was based on three grounds: (1) for taking and
damaging property for 'public use; (2) Nuisance damaging plaintiffs property; and (3) For negligence. The
portion of the opinion quoted by ap,pellant de'als with
the liability of a county for negligence. The court at
page 555 of the Utah Reports discusses the case of
Wendell v. Spokane County, 27 Wash. 121, 67 Pac. 576,
91 Am. St. Rep. 528. The court distinguishes the case
from the Lund case and in doing so quotes the following
from the Washington case :
'''This is an action for dam~ages caused by
draining the waters of a lake in Spokane County
onto the land.s of the plaintiffs, done by the order
of the board ·Of C·ounty Commisslioners in constructing a road across said lake.
The court found in this case that the County was
liable for damages.
In the case now hefore the court the

p~roposed

plant
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was to be installed by order of the Board of County
Commissioners.
The appellanto. place some reliance on the case of
Leibman vs. Richmond, 284 (P) 731, 103 Cal. App. 354.
We think that case is clearly distinguishable from the
case at bar. This was an action to abate the County
Court House of Alameda County as a nuisance. Under the
Statutes of California the County under exp.ress authority was directed to maintain a court house. There
was another law which provided:
''Sec. 3482 of the civil code provides. N othing which is done or maintaine·d under the expre~s
authority of a statute can he deemed a nuisance.''
There is no exp·ress statute in the case he·fore the court
which authorizes or directs Salt Lake County to operate a gravel mining and asphalt plant. Further we do
not have a comparable statute governing nuisances such
as California.
We submit that a municipal corporation shall not
be allowed to construct or maintain any plant which will
work an irreparable hardship on the residents of the
County.
II. Whether, wnmer the evidence before the C'OUrt
in this ,act)ion, a wuisamoe ·as (JJYb inevit~able result is est~ab
lished.
The assignment of error attacking the trial court's
findings iB. so broad that it is impossible for us to determine just wherein the findings of the court were in error
and what evidence is lacking to sustain the findings.
Certainly under the former rule 26 of this court such
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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an assignment of error would not be considered by the
court. Johnson et ux vs. Brinkerhoff et al( 57 (P) 2nd
1132, 89 Utah 530. To,vnsend vs. Holbrook, 56 (P) 2nd
610, 89 Utah 1-!7. Even under the p·resent rule to consider such an assignment would be giving the rule a
very liberal interpretation.
The court may, in equity cases, review all of the
evidence, but the findings of the trial court will not oe
disturbed unless the findings are against the evidence.
Anderson v. Anderson, 104 Utah 104, 138 (P) 2nd 252.
We invite the court to read the evidence· in this case a.nd
we submit that no finding made by the trial court is
against the evidence.
We now come to the question of the creation of a
nuisance by reason of the proposed installation and
operation of the plant. A public nuisance has been
defined by the legislature. 103-41-3 Utah Code Anno.
1943.
''A public nuisance is ·a crime against the
· order and economy of the state, and consists in
unlawfully doing any act, or omitting to perform
any duty, which act or omiasion either: (1) Annoys, injures or endangers the comfort, repose,
health or safety of three or more ~persons;''
The governor may under the statutes direct the
attorney general to abate such a nuisance.
104-56-1 Utah Code Annotated 19f3 defines a private
nmsance as:
''Anything which is injurious to health or
indecent, or offensive to the senses, or an obstrucSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tion to the free use of prop·erty, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or
property, is a nuiaance and the subject of an
action. Such action may be brought by any
person whose property is injuriously affected, or
whose personal enjoyment is less·ened by the
nuisance; ·and by the judgment the nuisance may
be enjoined or abated, and damages may also
be recovered.''
The evidence in this case discloses without contradiction that the operation of the plant would he noisy.
The testimony of Mrs. Speyer (Tr. 123, R.ec. 185), and
Mrs. Mays (Tr. 118-A, Ree. 180), is to the effect that
Mt. Olympus acts as a sounding board and that even
the noise of the present limited operation by Mr. Harper
is apparent. ·The limited operation conducted by Mr.
Harper is deBcribed by him (Tr. 163, Rec. 225). He
testified ~hat the only equipment used was a gravity
loader and screener and at most 4 trucks. This court
has held that noises and other disturbances may constitute an actionable nuisance, especially in a residential
neighborhood. Brough v. Ute Stampede As-Bn., 142 (P)
2nd, 670, 105 Utah 446.
The evidence as was stated in our statement of facts
is that the op·eration of the so-called· Catmul p·lant ·and
other comparable plants is dusty and that smoke and
odors from hot asphalt and firing of boilers is emitted.
This evidence is not seriously controverted. The only
claim made by appellants in their brief in this connection
is that the prevailing winds during the day time in this
area are from the North and West and that the dust and
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odors will be carried a \Yay from the residences. Indeed,
this is the only argument made in the brief attacking the
court's findings. The court after hearing all of the evidence found in finding No.4 (Rec. 48) that the p-revailing
winds were from the Southeast to the Northwest. This
finding was based on the testimony of the witness Butler
(Trans. 50, Rec. 111), who testified that he had made
actual tests of wind currents at the mouth of Big· Cottonwood Canyon. It \Yas further substanti~ated by the
witness Mrs. Mays (Trans. 118, Rec. 179) who had lived
in the area all of her life. To controvert this testimony
the appellants called Dr. Hawkes who testified that he
had written a thesis on wind currents in mountain valleys but who had made no actual tests in this area.. We
submit that the evidence clearly sus.tains the cour:t's
finding. This court has held that dust and odors or
either of them may constitute a nuisance even in areas
which are not exclusively residential.
Ludlow vs. Colorado Animal By-Products Co.,
137 (P) 2nd 347,104 Utah 221;
Thackery vs. Union Portland Cement Co.,
231 (P) 813, 64 Utah 437.
The p~roof is also uncontradicted that there is a
definite traffic hazard being;--£reated on Holl~aday Boulevard from the mouth of Big . Cottonwood Canyon to Holladay and that this traffic would be increased by 100
truck loads per day during the summer months. See
the evidence of Mrs. Speyer (Trans. 12'6, Rec. 188),
and Mrs. Mays ('Trans. 1182A, Rec. 180). The case of
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Benton vs. Kernan, 13 (A) 2nd 825, New Jersey, discusses excessive use of trucks and their effect on traffic
as creating a nuisance in residential neighborhoods and
holds that their operation may constitute a nuisance.
It is the contention of these plaintiffs that any one
of the activities proved would constitute a nuisance in
this particular case. The case of Benton v. Kernan supra
has this to say regarding the operation of a rock quarry
in a residential neighborhood.
"Considering the high-class residential character of the neighborhood, each of these noises
is a nuisance in itself; but the medley of all of
them, when the quarry is in full operation, produces such a din in the immediate neighborhood
as to render normal conversation difficult.''

III. Whether, ev.en assuming such nruisa;nce to be
the result of the defenrtarnts' activities, ,all-such activities
should be p,ermanently enjoined under the facts a;rnd circumstamces of this case.
S!alt Lake County has for years maintained and
repaired the streets and roads within the County without
operating an as-phalt plant in this residential area. The
present Commissioner Greenwood, testified that there
would be a saving of money for the asphalt used and
that he favored the gravel at the Harper pit. There is
no showing that there are not other available sites. There
is a serious question as to whether or not any saving
would be made on the asphalt used.
The answer of the defendants did not set up or
raise the issue of public good. All of the testimony
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rel·ative to eosts "~as objected to at the trial by the
plaintiffs. "\v"Te subn1it there is no showing that the public
as a 'vhole 'vould be benefited.
CONCLUSION
All of the errors assigned by appellants have been
answered.
Counties are. created by the legislature and their
powers and duties are defined by the legislature. The
legislature has relinquished any immunity a county
might have from suit by legislative enactment.
The county cannot create a nuisance or deprive its
citizens and residents of the quiet, peaceful enjoyment
of their homes.
All of the evidence conclusively establish~s the fact
that any one of the operations contemplated would have
created a nuisance, all combined would be intolerable.
No public necessity for such an operation in this
particular area was plead or shown.
It is submitted that the rulings and the fiindings of
the trial court were in accord with the law and the facts.
Respectfully submitted,
CRITCHLOW, WATSON & W ARNO·CK,

Attorneys tor Plaintiffs and Resp~ondents.
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